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Abstract 
Previous research has shown that rating words for their relevance to a survival 
scenario leads to better retention of the words than rating them for self-reference. Past studies 
have, however, relied exclusively on an autobiographical self-reference task in which 
participants rate how easily a common noun brings to mind a personal experience. We report 
five experiments comparing survival processing to a descriptive self-reference task in which 
participants rated how well trait words described them. Rating trait adjectives for survival 
value led to higher levels of recall and recognition than rating them for their relevance to a 
moving home scenario. Rating the adjectives for self-reference, however, led to higher levels 
of recall (Experiments 1 and 3) and recollection (Experiment 2) than survival rating. 
Experiment 4 replaced trait adjectives with trait nouns and found that self-reference led to 
greater recognition accuracy than survival processing. Experiment 5 used trait nouns 
followed by tests of free recall and found a memory advantage following self-reference that 
was not influenced by the imageability of the stimuli. The findings are discussed in terms of 
theories of the survival processing and self-reference effects and the relationship between 
them. 
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Survival Processing Versus Self-Reference: A Memory Advantage Following Descriptive 
Self-Referential Encoding 
The survival processing effect, first reported by Nairne and colleagues (e.g., Nairne, 
Thompson, & Pandeirada, 2007; Nairne, Pandeirada, & Thompson, 2008; Nairne & 
Pandeirada, 2010), refers to the finding that rating information for its relevance to a survival 
scenario enhances recall of the information, relative to other rating tasks. In the initial study 
by Nairne et al. (2007), participants were instructed to imagine a survival scenario in which 
they were stranded in the grasslands of a foreign country. They then rated a series of common 
nouns for their relevance to the scenario. In a surprise recall test, participants in the survival 
condition recalled more of the nouns than participants who rated them for pleasantness, self-
reference, or relevance to a ‘moving home’ scenario. The survival processing effect has been 
replicated in many subsequent studies (see Nairne, 2014, for a review) and has been extended 
to other stimuli, including pictures (Otgaar, Smeets, & van Bergen, 2010) and object 
locations (Nairne, VanArsdall, Pandeirada, & Blunt 2012).  
Researchers have also been concerned with identifying the mechanisms that underlie 
the survival processing effect. Nairne et al. (2007) proposed an evolutionary account whereby 
memory systems are tuned to remember information that is relevant to survival. This view 
was supported by Klein (2012) who made the point that a memory system will be maximally 
efficient when current demands match those for which it evolved. Other proposals have 
drawn on traditional memory theories. For example, Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011) 
presented evidence that the survival processing effect is the product of rich or distinctive 
encoding (Craik & Tulving, 1975), while Burns, Burns, and Hwang (2011) attributed the 
survival memory advantage to the combined effects of item-specific and relational processing 
(Einstein & Hunt, 1980; Hunt & Einstein, 1981). The survival processing advantage is also 
eliminated under conditions of cognitive load, suggesting that the effect is due to increased 
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elaboration of encoding (Kroneisen, Rummel, & Erdfelder, 2014; Nouchi, 2013). The 
congruity of the stimuli, whereby a word is more likely to be recalled if the response to a 
rating task is ‘yes’ rather than ‘no’ (Schulman, 1974), has also been shown to be an important 
factor (Butler, Kang, & Roediger, 2009, but see Nairne & Pandeirada, 2011).  
The point of departure for the current study is the proposal by Burns et al. (2011) that 
self-reference may be one of the mechanisms underlying the survival processing effect. As 
noted above, Burns et al. suggested that the survival processing effect occurs because 
survival rating activates both item-specific and relational processing. In support of this, they 
found that survival rating led to higher levels of recall and recognition relative to an orienting 
task that only recruited relational processing (a category sorting task) or a task that recruits 
only item-specific processing (sorting items into ad hoc categories). Burns et al. noted that 
the only other orienting task that recruits both relational and item-specific processing, rather 
than a trade-off between the two, is self-reference (see Klein & Loftus, 1988). This led Burns 
et al. to speculate that the survival processing and self-reference effects may have similar 
underlying mechanisms. As the authors observed, “After all, what is more self-relevant than 
considering one’s own survival?” (2011, p. 216).  
As Burns et al. (2011) acknowledged, the proposal that self-reference may underlie 
the survival processing effect is at odds with the findings of Nairne et al. (2007) that survival 
processing led to higher retention levels than self-reference (see also Kostic, McFarlan & 
Cleary, 2012; Nairne, Pandeirada, & Thompson, 2008; Nouchi & Kawashima, 2012). This 
view is also inconsistent with the findings of Weinstein, Bugg, and Roediger (2008) who 
compared first person (“Imagine that you are stranded in the grasslands of a foreign land…”) 
and third person (“Imagine that a friend is stranded in the grasslands of a foreign land…”) 
versions of the survival processing task. Although the first person perspective led to higher 
levels of recall when the survival instructions were set in a city scenario, Weinstein et al. 
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found no advantage for the first person perspective in the grasslands scenario. They 
concluded that the survival processing effect cannot be solely attributable to self-reference. 
This conclusion is supported by the findings of Kang, McDermott, and Cohen (2008) who 
showed that the survival processing advantage still occurs when the rating task refers to the 
survival of a third person.  
In contrast, the findings of Klein (2012) provide support for the role of self-reference 
in producing the survival processing effect. Klein compared survival processing with two 
self-reference conditions; one that required participants to retrieve autobiographical events 
and one that did not. Earlier work by Klein and colleagues (Klein, Loftus, & Burton, 1989) 
showed that the self-reference task is effective only when participants are instructed to 
retrieve an autobiographical event. Asking participants simply to rate how easy it would be to 
recall an autobiographical event did not produce the same memory advantage. Klein (2012) 
found that recall levels following survival processing were significantly higher than those 
produced by self-referential processing, but only when participants were not instructed to 
retrieve autobiographical events. Self-referential instructions that required participants to 
retrieve autobiographical events produced equivalent levels of recall to those produced by 
survival processing.  
The importance of self-reference in the survival processing effect was further 
illustrated by Cunningham, van den Bos, Gill, and Turk (2013) who compared self- versus 
other-referent versions of the survival paradigm. The self-referent version consisted of the 
original survival processing procedure developed by Nairne et al. (2007) in which 
participants were instructed to imagine being stranded in the grasslands of a foreign land and 
then rate the relevance of a series of common objects. Cunningham et al. compared this to an 
other-referent condition in which participants imagined David Cameron (British Prime 
Minister at the time) stranded in the grasslands. They found that recognition accuracy for the 
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object nouns was significantly higher in the self-reference condition than in the other-
reference condition, which was not significantly higher than a semantic rating condition. 
Cunningham attributed the inconsistency between their findings and those of Weinstein et al. 
(2008) to differences in experimental design. Specifically, their within-subjects manipulation 
of rating task may have rendered the difference between self and other conditions more 
salient than the between-subjects manipulation used by Weinstein et al.  
Given the powerful effects on memory of both survival processing and self-reference, 
it is important to establish the relationship between them and to determine the degree to 
which self-referential encoding underlies the survival processing effect. It is notable, 
however, that previous comparisons of survival and self-referential encoding have used only 
one type of self-reference task. As described above, participants in survival rating conditions 
are presented with lists of common nouns and asked to rate their relevance to a survival 
scenario. Performance in this condition has typically been compared to a self-reference 
condition in which participants are asked to rate how readily each noun brings to mind an 
autobiographical memory. Klein et al. (1989) referred to this as an autobiographical self-
reference task. There is, however, an alternative form of self-reference task, developed by 
Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker (1977), in which participants are presented with lists of trait 
adjectives (e.g., friendly, optimistic) and asked to indicate how well the traits describe them. 
Compared to valence ratings or rating the words for how well they describe another person, 
self-reference significantly enhances memory for the traits. Klein et al. referred to this as a 
descriptive self-reference task. As Klein et al. discussed, distinguishing between the two 
types of self-reference task clarifies some inconsistent findings within the self-reference 
literature. The studies reviewed by Klein et al. also indicate that, in terms of enhancing 
memory, the descriptive self-reference task is more effective than the autobiographical self-
reference task.  
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In the current study, we attempted to compare the mnemonic effects of survival and 
self-referential processing by comparing survival processing with the descriptive self-
reference task developed by Rogers et al. (1977). Rather than the common nouns used in 
previous survival processing studies, Experiments 1 to 3 reported below featured trait 
adjectives, which participants were instructed to rate either for self-reference or for their 
importance in a survival scenario. The survival rating instructions developed by Nairne et al. 
(2007) were adapted to direct participants to the importance of the personality traits in a 
survival scenario (see below for the full rating instructions). If survival processing leads to 
better retention of the trait adjectives, this would provide compelling support for the 
effectiveness of survival processing as a mnemonic aid, above and beyond the effects of self-
reference. If, on the other hand, self-reference leads to equivalent or higher levels of retention 
than survival processing, such a finding would i) provide important information about the 
boundary conditions of the survival processing effect and ii) support the proposal by Burns et 
al. (2011) and Klein (2012) that self-referential encoding is a potential proximate mechanism 
for the survival processing effect.  
Studies of the self-reference effect have typically found significant effects with 
relatively small sample sizes. For example, Bower and Gilligan (1979; Experiment 1) found a 
recall advantage for self-reference over a semantic rating task with eight participants in each 
condition. Bower and Gilligan (Experiment 2) also found an advantage for self- versus other-
reference with 10 participants in each group. More recently, Conway and Dewhurst (1995) 
found reliable self-reference effects in recognition memory with 12 participants in each group 
(see Conway, Dewhurst, Pearson, & Sapute, 2001, for discussion of effect sizes in self-
reference studies). The first comparison between self-reference and survival processing was 
reported by Nairne et al. (2007). As discussed above, however, Nairne et al. used the 
autobiographical self-reference task rather than the descriptive task. Nairne et al. also used a 
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within-subjects design in which participants took part in both the survival and the self-
reference conditions (within-subjects manipulations of self versus survival processing were 
also used by Cunningham et al., 2013, Kostic et al., 2008, and Weinstein et al., 2012). As 
discussed by Conway et al. (2001), however, within-subject designs are problematic for the 
self-reference effect because of the danger of carry-over effects. In order to avoid carry-over 
effects in the current study, we elected to use a between-subjects design but, owing to the 
powerful mnemonic effect of survival processing compared to other rating tasks, we recruited 
larger participant numbers than have typically been used in studies of the self-reference 
effect.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Ninety undergraduates (73 females) from the University of Hull 
participated for course credit. All were native English speakers between the ages of 18 and 
29. They were tested at individual workstations in groups of up to five.  
Stimuli and design. Thirty trait adjectives were selected from Anderson (1968). 
Previous research has shown that the self-reference effect is enhanced for positive traits 
(D’Argenbeau, Comblain, & Van der Linden, 2005). In order to investigate whether trait type 
dissociates self-reference and survival processing, we included 15 positive traits that were 
rated by Anderson as high in likableness (range 481-549; mean = 518) and 15 negative traits 
rated as low in likableness (range 52-196; mean = 114). Participants rated the traits on a 5-
point scale in one of three conditions (survival, self-reference, and valence) manipulated 
between groups, with 30 participants in each condition. The traits were presented in one of 
two random orders. 
Procedure. Participants were told that the aim of the study was to investigate how 
people think about personality traits. An incidental learning procedure was used whereby no 
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mention was made of the forthcoming recall test. Prior to the presentation of the lists, 
participants received one of the following sets of instructions: 
Survival condition. In this task, I would like you to imagine that you are stranded 
alone in the grasslands of a foreign land, without any basic survival materials. Over the next 
few months, you’ll need to find steady supplies of food and water and protect yourself from 
predators. I am going to show you a list of personality traits that may or may not describe 
you. What I would like you to do is rate how important these personality traits would be for 
you in this survival situation. Some of the traits may be important and others may not - it’s up 
to you to decide. 
 Self-reference condition. In this task, I am going to show you a list of words describing 
personality traits. What I would like you to do is rate how well each of these words describes 
you. Some of the words may describe you well and others not well - it’s up to you to decide.  
 Valence condition. In this task, I am going to show you a list of words describing 
personality traits. What I would like you to do is rate the words for whether they are positive 
or negative. Some of the traits may be positive and others may be negative - it’s up to you to 
decide. 
 These instructions were supplemented with additional information about how to use the 
5-point rating scale. The traits were then read aloud at a rate of one every 10 seconds. 
Participants rated the words using a three-page response booklet. The traits were not included 
in the booklet. Participants in the survival condition were asked to rate the importance of each 
trait on a 5-point scale from 1 = not important to 5 = very important. The rating scale for the 
self-reference condition ranged from 1 = not well to 5 = very well, and the rating scale for the 
valence condition ranged from 1 = negative to 5 = positive. After rating the traits, participants 
were engaged in maths problems for two minutes. This was followed by a surprise recall test 
in which they were instructed to recall as many words as possible, in any order, on a response 
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sheet provided. Participants were allowed 5 minutes to complete the recall test.  
Results and Discussion 
 Alpha was set at .05 for all main effects and interactions. All pairwise comparisons 
were bonferroni-adjusted. Table 1 shows mean levels of correct and false recall as a function 
of rating task and likeableness. Correct recall scores were analysed in a 3 (rating task: 
survival vs. self-reference vs. valence) x 2 (likeableness: high vs. low) Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) with repeated measures on the second factor. The main effect of rating task was 
significant, F (2,87) = 5.49, MSE = 4.12, p = .006, ηp2 = .11. Pairwise comparisons indicated 
that the self-reference group recalled significantly more traits than the survival group, p = .01, 
and the valence group, p = .03. The latter two did not differ reliably from one another, p = 
1.00. A significant main effect of likeableness was also observed, F (1,87) = 36.90, MSE = 
2.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .30, whereby recall of high-likeableness traits exceeded recall of low-
likeableness traits. The interaction between rating task and likeableness was not significant, 
F<1. A one-way between-groups ANOVA on the numbers of intrusions found that they were 
not significantly affected by rating task, F < 1.  
 Study ratings for the three encoding conditions were analysed in a one-way between 
groups ANOVA. This revealed a significant main effect of rating task, F (2,87) = 33.15, p < 
.001. Pairwise comparisons indicated that ratings were significantly lower in the survival 
condition (M = 2.65, SD = 0.42) relative to the self-reference (M = 3.24, SD = 0.26) and 
valence (M = 3.14, SD = 0.15) conditions, both ps < .001. The self-reference and valence 
conditions did not differ reliably from one another, p = .70.  
 The main finding from Experiment 1 is that rating trait adjectives for self-reference 
led to significantly higher levels of correct recall than rating them for survival value. This 
finding confirms the effectiveness of self-referential encoding as a mnemonic aid and 
indicates that it can be even more effective than survival processing. Burns et al. (2011) and 
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Klein (2012) proposed that self-reference is a proximate mechanism for the survival 
processing effect. If that was the case, one would expect to find equivalent levels of false 
recall across the two tasks. The finding that self-reference leads to higher levels of recall than 
survival processing suggests that remembering information that is relevant to one’s self-
concept is the higher priority. Traits rated by Anderson (1968) as high in likeableness were 
more likely to be recalled than traits rated as low in likeableness. This effect did not, 
however, interact with rating task. The higher study ratings for self-reference relative to the 
survival condition means that we cannot rule out the possibility that the memory advantage is 
driven by congruity. This is addressed in Experiment 3. Prior to that, we report Experiment 2 
in which we compared the effects of self-reference and survival processing on recognition 
memory.  
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 1 showed that self-referential encoding led to higher levels of recall than 
survival processing. Nairne et al. (2007, Experiment 3) extended the survival processing 
paradigm to recognition memory and found that survival processing led to higher levels of 
recognition than a moving home scenario. The aim of Experiment 2 was to compare the 
effects of survival processing and self-reference on a surprise test of recognition memory. As 
well as comparing the effects of rating task on overall hit rates, we used the ‘remember-
know’ procedure (Tulving, 1985; Gardiner, 1988) to investigate how the rating tasks 
influenced the subjective experience of recognition memory. In this procedure, participants 
are instructed to categorize positive recognition decisions as ‘remember’ responses if they 
consciously recollect some aspect of an item’s study presentation, or as ‘know’ responses if 
an item is recognized in the absence of conscious recollection (see Procedure section).  
An additional aim of Experiment 2 was to address the surprising finding from 
Experiment 1 that survival processing did not enhance correct recall relative to the valence 
©2018, Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Survival versus self-reference 
  11
condition. In other words, we failed to replicate the survival processing effect reported by 
Nairne and colleagues. Before we can argue that self-reference leads to a greater memory 
enhancement than survival processing, we need to show that survival processing can enhance 
memory for trait adjectives, relative to other encoding tasks. It is possible that valence 
judgements involve a social desirability judgement that is also invoked by self-reference (see 
Ferguson, Rule, & Carlson, 1983), which would suggest that it is not a neutral comparison 
task (we consider this further in the General Discussion). In order to enable more direct 
comparison with previous studies, we replaced the valence condition with a ‘moving home’ 
scenario in Experiment 2.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were a new group of 90 undergraduates (61 females) from 
the University of Hull who participated for payment or course credit. All were native English 
speakers between the ages of 18 and 32. They were tested at individual workstations in 
groups of up to five.  
Stimuli and design. Stimuli consisted of 72 trait adjectives selected from Anderson 
(1968) and divided into two sets of 36. As likeableness did not interact with rating task in 
Experiment 1, it was not manipulated in Experiment 2 and the two sets were simply matched 
for mean likableness. Each participant rated one set of traits presented in a random order, 
with 30 participants in each condition (self-reference, survival, and moving home). The 
recognition test consisted of all 72 traits presented in a random order. Traits not presented at 
study served as the lures in the recognition test. The rating task and recognition test were 
presented using E-Prime software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). 
Procedure. As in Experiment 1, participants were told that the aim of the study was 
to investigate how people think about personality traits, with no mention of the forthcoming 
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recognition test. The self-reference and survival rating instructions were the same as 
Experiment 1. Participants in the moving home scenario received the following instructions: 
In this task, I would like you to imagine that you are planning to move to a new home 
in a foreign land. Over the next few months, you’ll need to locate and purchase a new home 
and transport your belongings. I am going to show you a list of personality traits that may or 
may not describe you. What I would like you to do is rate how important these personality 
traits would be for you in accomplishing this task. Some of the traits may be important and 
others may not - it’s up to you to decide. 
The words were presented in a different random order for each participant at a rate of 
one every 5 seconds.  Each word remained on the screen for the full 5 seconds regardless of 
how quickly participants responded. E-Prime software (Schneider et al., 2002) was used to 
present the stimuli and record the ratings. After rating the traits, participants were engaged in 
maths problems for 5 minutes and were then given the instructions for the remember/know 
recognition task. For each test item, participants made an old/new decision followed by a 
remember/know/guess decision if the item was identified as old. Definitions of remember, 
know, and guess responses were adapted from Dewhurst and Anderson (1999). In brief, 
participants were instructed to make a remember response to a test item if they could 
consciously recollect seeing it in the study list and could recall contextual details such as 
thoughts, images, and associations that came to mind at the time. They were instructed to 
make a know response if the word felt familiar from the study list but they were unable to 
recollect any detail of its occurrence. If they were unable to decide if a word was old or new, 
they were given the option of making an ‘old’ response and then categorising it as a guess. 
Test items appeared one at a time on the computer and participants were instructed to make 
old/new decisions by pressing the 1 and 2 keys on the number pad with the first and second 
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fingers of their dominant hand. If they made an ‘old’ response, participants were prompted to 
press 1 for remember, 2 for know, or 3 for a guess.  
Results and Discussion 
 Table 2 shows mean levels of correct recognition, false recognition, and d prime (d') 
as a function of rating task and response type. Statistical analyses consisted of one-way 
between-subjects ANOVAs with rating task as the independent variable. Overall recognition 
rates (remember plus know) are reported first, followed by separate analyses of remember 
and know responses, then d' analyses. Guess responses were not included in the analyses 
because they were made below chance levels. In order to avoid proportions of 0 and 1 in the 
analysis of d', we used the correction recommended by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) 
whereby 0.5 was added to hit and false alarm rates and the corrected scores were divided by 
the maximum possible score +1.   
Analysis of overall hit rates showed a significant effect of rating task F (2,87) = 6.54 
MSE = 18.14, p = .002, ηp2 = .13. Pairwise comparisons showed that both self-reference and 
survival led to higher hit rates than moving, p = .004 and p = .015 respectively. No significant 
difference was observed between self-reference and survival, p = 1.00. The analysis of 
correct remember responses also showed a significant effect of rating task, F (2,87) = 17.20, 
MSE = 36.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .28. Pairwise comparisons showed that self-reference led to 
higher levels of correct remember responses than survival, p = .021, and moving, p < .001. 
Survival also led to higher levels of correct remember responses than moving, p = .008. A 
significant effect of rating task was also observed in the analysis of correct know responses, F 
(2,87) = 8.79, MSE = 26.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .17. Pairwise comparisons showed that self-
reference led to significantly lower levels of correct know responses than survival, p = .017, 
and moving, p < .001, which did not differ significantly from each other, p = .65.  
©2018, Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Survival versus self-reference 
  14
Analysis of overall false alarm rates showed a significant effect of rating task, F 
(2,87) = 4.58, MSE = 5.40, p = .013, ηp2 = .10. Pairwise comparisons showed that moving led 
to higher levels of false alarms than self-reference, p = .011. No significant differences were 
observed between self-reference and survival, p = .74, or between survival and moving, p = 
.21. False remember responses were low and not significantly affected by rating task, F 
(2,87) = 1.50, MSE = 2.16, p = .23, ηp2 = .03. There was a significant effect of rating task in 
false know responses, F (2,87) = 5.38, MSE = 2.01, p = .006, ηp2 = .11. Pairwise comparisons 
showed that moving led to significantly more false know responses than self-reference, p = 
.005, but not survival, p = .38. Self-reference and survival did not differ significantly from 
each other, p = .26. 
Analysis of overall d' rates showed a significant effect of rating task F (2,87) = 9.48 
MSE = .39, p < .001, ηp2 = .18. Pairwise comparisons showed that moving led to significantly 
lower recognition accuracy than survival, p = .003, and self-reference, p < .001. No 
significant difference was observed between survival and self-reference, p = 1.00. The 
analysis of d' for remember responses also showed a significant effect of rating task, F (2,87) 
= 18.55, MSE =.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .30. Pairwise comparisons showed that self-reference led 
to significantly higher levels of remember accuracy than survival, p=.041, and moving home, 
p<.001. Survival also led to higher levels of remember accuracy than moving, p = .002. The 
main effect of rating task in d' for K responses was not significant, F (2,87) = 2.80, MSE = 
.36, p = .066, ηp2 = .06.  
Study ratings were also analysed in a between-subjects ANOVA. This showed a 
significant main effect of rating task, F (2,69) = 14.61, MSE =.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .30. 
Pairwise comparisons showed that mean ratings were higher in the self-reference condition 
(M=3.45, SD=.22) than in the survival (M=2.95, SD=.43) and moving (M=2.98, SD=.38) 
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conditions, both ps < .001. The survival and moving conditions did not differ significantly 
from each other, p = 1.00.  
The main finding of Experiment 2 is that, although there was no difference in overall 
hit rates, self-referential encoding led to more remember responses and fewer know responses 
than survival processing. Self-reference thus led to an increase in recollection, as measured 
by remember responses, rather than overall recognition. This pattern was observed both in 
raw scores and in the d' rates. The selective increase in remember responses mirrors findings 
from previous investigations of the self-reference effect. Conway and Dewhurst (1995) found 
no difference between self-reference and valence ratings in overall recognition memory, but 
self-reference led to more remember and fewer know responses than valence ratings. The 
same pattern was also reported by Conway et al. (2001), who argued that self-referential 
processing facilitates the encoding of new experiences within the autobiographical 
knowledge base (see Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
An important finding from Experiment 2 is that the survival condition led to higher 
recognition scores than the moving condition, in terms of both overall hit rates and remember 
responses. This allows us to rule out the possibility that the advantage for self-referential 
encoding is due to a failure to replicate the survival processing effect. One concern, however, 
is that study ratings were again higher in the self-reference condition than in the survival 
condition. Although the two conditions did not feature the same rating task, the difference in 
rating scores means we cannot rule out the possibility that the superior memory performance 
in the self condition was due to greater congruity, as higher scores indicate more positive 
responses. Comparison between the survival and moving scenario suggests that congruity 
may not be the critical factor, as survival led to higher levels of recognition despite there 
being no difference in study ratings. Nevertheless, it is important to rule out the possible 
effects of congruity on the difference between survival processing and self-reference. 
©2018, Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Survival versus self-reference 
  16
Previous research has shown that the effect of survival processing on memory for common 
nouns is enhanced when the nouns are congruent with a survival scenario (Butler et al., 2009, 
Nairne & Pandeirada, 2011).  
In order to address the effect of congruity within the current study, we conducted a 
third experiment in which participants studied trait adjectives that were pre-rated as important 
in a survival scenario. This was essentially a replication of Experiment 1 but with a new set 
of traits, half of which were pre-rated as being important in a survival scenario (e.g., 
resourceful, alert) and half of which were pre-rated as not being important (e.g., dignified, 
charming). If the lower performance in the survival condition relative to the self-reference 
condition was due to the lower ratings in the survival condition, then it should be possible to 
reverse the effect using traits that are more likely to be rated as important in a survival 
scenario. We also replaced the valence condition with the moving scenario. 
An additional aim of Experiment 3 was to investigate the proposal by Klein, 
Robertson, and Delton (2011) that it is not survival processing per se, but the future planning 
aspect of survival processing, that it critical to the survival processing effect. Klein et al. 
compared three encoding tasks: Survival, future planning in a non-survival scenario, and 
survival plus planning. They found that the two conditions involving planning led to higher 
levels of recall than the survival condition. In Experiment 3, we adapted the survival 
processing instructions to emphasise planning. In short, Experiment 3 featured two 
modifications to the design of Experiment 1 that were intended to facilitate memory 
performance in the survival rating condition.  
Experiment 3 
Method 
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Participants. A new group of 90 undergraduates (66 females) from the University of 
Hull participated for course credit. All were native English speakers between the ages of 18 
and 36. They were tested at individual workstations in groups of up to five.  
Stimuli and design. A new set of 24 trait adjectives was selected from Anderson 
(1968). Twelve of the traits were selected by the authors as likely to be rated as important in a 
survival situation and 12 as likely to be rated as not important. Five independent raters were 
asked to rate the traits for their importance in a survival situation using the 5-point scale used 
in the survival study phase of Experiment 1. Mean importance ratings were 4.18 for the high 
importance traits and 1.88 for the low importance traits. The mean likableness ratings were 
414 for the high importance list and 435 for the low importance list.  
Procedure. As in Experiment 1, participants were told that the aim of the study was 
to investigate how people think about personality traits. The traits were presented in a 
different random order for each participant and E-Prime software (Schneider et al., 2002) was 
used to present the stimuli and record the ratings. After rating the traits, participants were 
engaged in maths problems for two minutes and were then given a surprise recall test. The 
rating instructions for the self-reference and moving home conditions were the same as in 
Experiment 2. The survival rating instructions were amended to emphasise planning, as 
follows: 
In this task, I would like you to imagine that you are stranded alone in the grasslands 
of a foreign land, without any basic survival materials. You need to plan how you are going 
to survive until you are rescued. Your plans must include finding steady supplies of food and 
water and protecting yourself from predators. I am going to show you a list of words 
describing personality traits. What I would like you to do is rate how important each of these 
personality traits would be in planning how to survive in this situation. Some of the traits may 
be important and others may not—it’s up to you to decide. 
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Results and Discussion 
 Table 3 shows mean levels of correct and false recall as a function of rating task and 
survival value. A 3 (rating task: survival vs. self-reference vs. moving) x 2 (survival value: 
high vs low importance) ANOVA on correct recall scores showed a significant main effect of 
rating task, F (2,87) = 33.66, MSE = 2.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .44. Pairwise comparisons showed 
that recall levels were higher in the self-reference than the survival condition, p = .04, which 
in turn were higher than in the moving condition, p < .001. Neither the main effect of survival 
value, F (2,87) = 2.03, MSE = 2.30, p = .16, ηp2 = .02, nor the interaction, F < 1, were 
significant. A one-way between-subjects ANOVA on the number of intrusions also showed a 
significant main effect of rating task, F (2,87) = 13.84 MSE = 1.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .24. 
Pairwise comparisons showed that false recall levels were higher in the moving condition 
than in the survival condition, p = .001, and the self-reference condition, p < .001, which did 
not differ reliably from each other, p = .73.  
 Study ratings were analysed in a 3 (rating task) x 2 (survival value) mixed ANOVA. 
The main effect of rating task was not significant, F (2,87) = 2.53, MSE = .28, p = .09, ηp2 = 
.06. There was a significant main effect of survival value, whereby high value traits were 
given higher ratings than low value traits, F (2,87) = 154.70, MSE = .18, p < .001, ηp2 = .64. 
This was qualified by a significant rating task x survival value interaction, F (2,87) = 135.12, 
MSE = .17, p < .001, ηp2 = .76. Pairwise comparisons showed that, as expected, participants 
in the survival condition rated the high value traits (M = 4.27, SD = 0.33) as significantly 
higher in survival value than low value traits (M = 2.17, SD = 0.55), p < .001. Participants in 
the moving condition also rated the high value traits (M = 3.74, SD = 0.45) as more useful in 
a moving scenario than the low value traits (M = 3.13, SD = 0.64), p < .001. In contrast, 
participants in the self-reference condition rated the high value traits (M = 3.18, SD = 0.43) as 
less self-relevant than the low value traits (M = 3.56, SD = 0.41), p < .001. High value traits 
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were given higher ratings in the survival and moving conditions than the self-reference 
condition, both ps < .001. In contrast, the low value traits were given higher ratings in the 
self-reference condition than in the survival and moving conditions, both ps < .001.  
The findings of Experiment 3 are broadly consistent with those of Experiments 1 and 
2. Rating trait adjectives for self-reference led to reliably better memory for the traits than 
rating them for survival value. This was the case even though the survival instructions 
emphasised planning, which has previously been show to enhance the mnemonic benefit of 
survival rating (Klein et al., 2011). Nor was the effect of survival rating on memory 
influenced by the congruity of the traits. Traits that were pre-rated as important for survival 
were no more likely to be recalled than traits that were pre-rated as unimportant, and both 
sets of traits were more likely to be recalled following self-reference rating than survival 
rating. Thus, even when encoding conditions were especially conducive to survival 
processing, self-reference still led to significantly higher levels of recall.  
One limitation of the experiments reported thus far is that they have all relied on the 
use of trait adjectives as the to-be-remembered stimuli. This raises questions about the 
generality of the advantage for self-reference over survival processing. There has been 
considerable debate about whether a self-reference effect occurs with nouns. The 
autobiographical self-reference task typically uses nouns as stimuli and, as discussed above, 
this type of self-reference task is less effective as a mnemonic device than the descriptive 
self-reference task (see Klein et al., 1989). As discussed above, it has also been shown to be a 
less effective mnemonic device than survival processing (e.g., Nairne et al., 2007).  
A number of studies have incorporated stimuli other than trait adjectives into a 
descriptive self-reference task. For example, Keenan, Golding, and Brown (1992) found that 
occupation terms were recalled better following self-reference than following reference to 
Ronald Reagan. More recently, Serbun, Shih, and Gutchess (2011) found that participants 
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who rated pictures of common objects for self-reference had higher recognition scores than 
participants who them for reference to their mother or to Bill Clinton. In contrast, Maki and 
McCaul (1985) found that self-reference led to higher recall of trait adjectives and lower 
recall of nouns, relative to conditions in which the words were rated for reference to the 
participant’s mother or to Ronald Reagan. The effects of self-reference on memory for nouns 
also appears to depend on the type of noun. For example, Czienskowski and Giljohann (2002) 
compared the effects of self-reference and reference to an intimate or non-intimate other on 
the recall of concrete and abstract nouns. They found that self-reference reduced recall of 
concrete nouns relative to the other-reference conditions, but increased recall of abstract 
nouns relative to the non-intimate other condition.   
A problem with using object nouns in the self-reference task is that, compared to trait 
adjectives, they are difficult to relate to oneself in a descriptive sense (see Keenan et al., 
1992, for further discussion of this). Estimating how likely one is to use an object is unlikely 
to initiate the same degree of self-referential encoding as rating how well a trait describes 
oneself. As noted by Maki and McCaul (1985), traits reflect central aspects of one’s self-
schema but objects may not. Based on the results of two experiments, they concluded that 
“self-reference facilitates memory for traits but fails to improve memory for nouns” (p.171). 
It seems unlikely, however, that the self-reference effect is constrained by the grammatical 
class of the stimuli. It is more likely that the critical factor is how meaningfully the stimuli 
can be evaluated in reference to oneself. In order to address this, we conducted Experiment 4 
in which we replaced trait adjectives with trait nouns.   
Experiment 4 
Method 
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Participants. A new group of 90 undergraduates (65 females) from the University of 
Hull participated for course credit. All were native English speakers between the ages of 18 
and 46. They were tested at individual workstations in groups of up to five.  
Stimuli and design. Eighty trait nouns were selected from Saucier (2003) and divided 
into two sets of 40. Examples included optimist, genius, poet, and leader. Participants rated 
the nouns on a 5-point scale in one of three conditions (survival, self-reference, and moving) 
manipulated between groups, with 30 participants in each condition. The nouns were 
presented in a different random order for each participant. 
Procedure. Participants were again told that the study investigated how people think 
about personality traits. Prior to the presentation of the lists, participants received one of the 
following sets of instructions: 
Survival condition. In this task, I would like you to imagine that you are stranded 
alone in the grasslands of a foreign land, without any basic survival materials. You need to 
plan how you are going to survive until you are rescued. Your plans must include finding 
steady supplies of food and water and protecting yourself from predators. I am going to show 
you a list of words that might be used to describe someone. What I would like you to do is 
rate how important each of these traits would be in planning how to survive in this situation. 
Some of the traits may be important and others may not—it’s up to you to decide. 
Self-reference condition. In this task, I am going to show you a list of words that 
might be used to describe someone. What I would like you to do is rate how well each of these 
traits describes you. Some of the traits may describe you well and others not well - it’s up to 
you to decide.  
Moving condition. In this task, I would like you to imagine that you are planning to 
move to a new home in a foreign land. Over the next few months, you’ll need to locate and 
purchase a new home and transport your belongings. I am going to show you a list of words 
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that might be used to describe someone. What I would like you to do is rate how important 
each of these traits would be for you in accomplishing this task. Some of the items may be 
important and others may not—it’s up to you to decide. 
 Participants in the survival and moving conditions were asked to rate the importance of 
each trait on a 5-point scale from 1 = not important to 5 = very important. The rating scale for 
the self-reference condition ranged from 1 = not well to 5 = very well. After rating the traits, 
participants were engaged in maths problems for 5 minutes and then given a surprise 
recognition test. The test included all 80 trait nouns presented in a different random order for 
each participant. Traits not presented at study served as the lures in the recognition test. 
Instructions for remember, know and guess responses were the same as Experiment 2.  
Results and Discussion 
Table 4 shows mean levels of correct recognition, false recognition, and d' as a 
function of rating task and response type. Statistical analyses consisted of separate one-way 
between-subjects ANOVAs with rating task as the independent variable. Analysis of overall 
hit rates showed a significant effect of rating task F (2,87) = 9.28 MSE = 14.70, p < .001, ηp2 
= .18. Pairwise comparisons showed that moving led to significantly lower hit rates than both 
the self-reference, p < .001, and survival, p = .008, which did not differ from each other, p = 
.90. The same pattern emerged in the analysis of correct remember responses. The effect of 
rating task was significant, F (2,87) = 10.91, MSE = 68.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .20, and pairwise 
comparisons showed that moving led to significantly lower correct remember rates than both 
the self-reference, p=.001 and survival, p=.003, which did not differ from each other, p= .97. 
A significant effect of rating task was also observed in the analysis of correct K responses, F 
(2,87) = 4.57, MSE = 54.13, p = .013, ηp2 = .10. Pairwise comparisons showed that moving 
led to higher levels of correct know responses than self-reference, p = .016. The differences 
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between between moving and survival, p = .075, and between self-reference and survival, p = 
1.00, were not significant.  
Analysis of overall false alarm rates showed a significant effect of rating task, F 
(2,87) = 4.44, MSE = 3.50, p = .015, ηp2 = .09. Pairwise comparisons showed that survival led 
to higher levels of false alarms than self-reference, p = .012. No significant differences were 
observed between self-reference and moving, p = .65, or between survival and moving, p = 
.27. False remember responses were not significantly affected by rating task, F < 1. There 
was a significant effect of rating task in false know responses, F (2,87) = 6.56, MSE = 1.42, p 
= .002, ηp2 = .13. Pairwise comparisons showed that survival led to significantly more false 
know responses than self-reference, p = .002. No significant differences were observed 
between self-reference and moving, p = .59, or between survival and moving, p = .076.  
Analysis of overall d' rates showed a significant effect of rating task F (2,87) = 7.60, 
MSE = .39, p = .001, ηp2 = .15. Pairwise comparisons showed that self-reference led to 
significantly higher recognition accuracy than survival, p = .047, and moving, p = .001 which 
did not differ significantly from each other, p = .51. The analysis of remember d' also showed 
a significant effect of rating task, F (2,87) = 11.24, MSE =.50, p = .001, ηp2 = .21. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that both self-reference and survival led to significantly higher levels of 
remember accuracy than moving, p < .001, and p = .006 respectively. The difference between 
self-reference and survival was not significant, p = .45.  The main effect of rating task in 
know d' was also significant, F (2,87) = 6.03, MSE = .57, p = .004, ηp2 = .12. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that moving led to lower know d' than both survival, p = .009, and self-
reference, p = .012, which did not differ significantly from each other, p =1.00.  
Study ratings were also analysed in a repeated measures one-way ANOVA. The effect 
of rating task was significant, F (2,87) = 3.38, MSE =.25, p = .039, ηp2 = .07, though none of 
the pairwise comparisons reached statistical significance. Mean ratings for survival, self-
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reference and moving were 2.22 (SD = 0.44), 2.53 (SD = 0.43), and 2.27 (SD = 0.59), 
respectively.  
The main finding from Experiment 4 is that the survival and self-reference conditions 
both led to higher levels of correct recognition than the moving condition. In contrast to the 
findings of Experiments 2, survival and self-reference led to equivalent levels of recognition, 
both in terms of overall hit rates and in terms of correct remember responses. However, self-
reference led to more accurate recognition performance than survival processing as measured 
by d', which appears to be be due to the higher levels of false alarms in the survival condition. 
The increase in false recognition following survival processing is consistent with findings 
reported by Howe and Derbish (2010) using the DRM procedure (Deese, 1959, Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995). Howe and Derbish found that survival processing led to higher levels of 
false recognition than moving and pleasantness ratings (see Otgaar & Smeets, 2010, for a 
similar effect in false recall).  
Experiment 4 also showed that a self-reference effect can be observed with trait nouns 
as well as trait adjectives, although the difference between self-reference and survival 
processing was observed in recognition accuracy rather than hit rates. We consider this 
pattern further in the General Discussion. Prior to that, we report a fifth experiment in which 
we investigated the effects of imageability on self-reference and survival processing. Two 
recent studies (Bell, Roer, & Buckner, 2013, and Kroneisen & Makerud, 2016) showed that 
the survival processing advantage is eliminated when the stimuli are abstract or of low 
imageability. Kroneisen and Makerud suggested that the survival advantage is confined to 
high-imageability words because participants can more readily imagine practical uses of 
items that are easily visualized. As noted above, Czienskowski and Giljohann (2002) found 
that the self-reference effect was more likely to be observed for abstract than for concrete 
nouns. These findings are relevant to the current study because trait adjectives are typically 
©2018, Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Survival versus self-reference 
  25
abstract and of low imageability. It is possible, therefore, that the failure to find a survival 
advantage relative to self-reference in Experiments 1-3 was due to the use of low-
imageability stimuli. This possibility was investigated in Experiment 5, in which imageability 
was included an independent variable.  
The MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981) includes ratings of 
imageability on a scale of 100 to 700. The high-imageability words used by Kroneisen and 
Makerud (2016) had mean ratings of 583. In contrast, the mean imageability ratings for the 
trait adjectives used in Experiments 1 to 3 are 399, 396, and 397. These are closer to the low-
imageability words used by Kroneisen and Makerud, which had a mean rating of 334. Mean 
imageability ratings of the trait nouns used in Experiment 4 are higher at 494, but ratings 
were only available for 19 of the 80 nouns. However, one advantage of trait nouns is that, 
compared to trait adjectives, it is possible to find more items that are of high imageability. To 
illustrate, the trait adjective artistic has an imageability rating of 440 whereas the trait noun 
artist has an imageability rating of 600. This greater variation in the imageability of trait 
nouns enabled us to construct a study list in which half the nouns were of high imageability 
and half were of low imageability.  
Experiment 5 
Method 
Participants. A new group of 90 undergraduates (67 females) from the University of 
Hull participated for course credit. All were native English speakers between the ages of 18 
and 45 (M = 20.43, SD = 4.27). They were tested at individual workstations in groups of up 
to five.  
Stimuli, design, and procedure. Twenty-four trait nouns were selected from Saucier 
(2003), of which 12 were rated as high-imageability (angel, animal, artist, brat, chatterbox, 
chicken, child, clown, friend, star, victim, wreck) and 12 as low-imageability (amateur, bore, 
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character, cynic, eccentric, fool, liar, menace, mortal, radical, saint, thinker). Mean 
imageability ratings from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981) were 578 for 
the high-imageability set and for 395 the low-imageability set. An independent samples t-test 
confirmed a significant difference in imageability ratings between the two sets, t (22) = 
14.15, p < .001. The stimuli are comparable to those used by Kroneisen and Makerud (2016), 
which had mean imageability ratings of 583 and 334. The ratings of the low-imageability 
items are also comparable to those of the trait adjectives using in Experiment 1 to 3 (see 
above). Participants rated the nouns on a 5-point scale in one of three conditions (survival, 
self-reference, and moving) manipulated between groups, with 30 participants in each 
condition. The nouns were presented in a different random order for each participant. The 
rating instructions were the same as those used in Experiment 4. After rating the traits, 
participants were engaged in maths problems for 2 minutes and then given a surprise free 
recall test.  
Results and Discussion 
 Table 5 shows the mean levels of correct recall as a function of rating task and 
imageability, plus the mean levels of false recall as a function of rating task. A 3 (rating task: 
survival vs. self-reference vs. moving) x 2 (imageability: high versus low) ANOVA on 
correct recall scores showed a significant main effect of rating task, F (2,87) = 13.81, MSE = 
2.96, p = .001, ηp2 = .24. Pairwise comparisons showed that correct recall scores were higher 
in the self-reference condition than in the survival condition, p = .044, and the moving 
condition, p < .001. Correct recall scores were also higher in the survival condition than in 
the moving condition, p = .021. The main effect of imageability was also significant, F (1,87) 
= 14.14, MSE = 2.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .14, with higher recall scores for high-imageability 
nouns relative to low-imageability nouns. The interaction between rating task and 
imageability was not significant, F (1,87) = 2.14, MSE = 2.97, p = .12, ηp2 = .05. A one-way 
©2018, Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Survival versus self-reference 
  27
between-subjects ANOVA on the number of intrusions also showed a significant main effect 
of rating task, F (1,87) = 3.31, MSE = 1.46, p = .041, ηp2 = .07. Pairwise comparisons showed 
that false recall levels were lower in the self-reference condition than in the moving 
condition, p = .036. The self and survival conditions did not differ significantly, p = .42, nor 
did the survival and moving conditions, p = .87. 
The analysis of study ratings showed a significant main effect of rating task, F (2,87) 
= 5.36, MSE =.23, p = .006, ηp2 = .11. Mean study ratings were significantly higher in the 
self-reference condition relative to the moving condition, p = .005. No significant differences 
were observed between self-reference and survival, p = .34, or between survival and moving, 
p = 30. Mean ratings for survival, self-reference and moving were 2.27 (SD=.47), 2.47 (SD = 
0.35), and 2.07 (SD = 0.58), respectively.  
 The main finding from Experiment 5 is that self-reference again led to higher recall 
levels than survival and moving, replicating the results of Experiments 1 and 3. The 
nonsignificant interaction between rating task and imagery indicates that the effects observed 
in Experiments 1 and 3 were not simply due to the use of low imagery stimuli. As can be seen 
from Table 5, correct recall scores were numerically higher in the self-reference condition, 
relative to the survival and moving conditions, for both high and low imagery traits. We 
consider this further in the General Discussion.  
General Discussion 
Previous studies have shown that survival processing leads to better recall and 
recognition of common nouns, relative to a self-referential encoding task in which 
participants rate how easily each noun cues an autobiographical memory (e.g., Nairne et al., 
2007). The current studies compared the mnemonic effects of survival processing with a 
descriptive self-referential encoding task in which participants rated personality traits for self-
reference. Participants in the survival condition rated the traits for their importance in a 
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survival situation. Survival processing led to a memory advantage relative to a control 
condition in which the traits were rated for their importance in a moving home scenario, thus 
replicating the survival processing effect observed in previous research (e.g., Nairne et al., 
2007). However, in contrast to studies that used the autobiographical self-reference task, 
descriptive self-referential encoding led to better retention of the trait adjectives than survival 
processing. This effect was observed in both free recall (Experiments 1 and 3) and in the 
recollection component of recognition memory (Experiment 2). Experiment 4 replaced trait 
adjectives with trait nouns and found equivalent levels of correct recognition following 
survival processing and self-reference, but higher levels of recognition accuracy in the self-
reference condition. Experiment 5 found a recall advantage for trait nouns following self-
referential encoding using a combination of high- and low-imageability nouns. Below, we 
discuss a number of possible explanations of these findings.  
The most salient difference between the current study and previous investigations of 
the survival processing effect is the use of trait adjectives rather than common nouns. In 
terms of the evolutionary account proposed by Nairne and colleagues (see Nairne, 2014, 
Nairne et al., 2007), it is possible that the instruction to evaluate trait adjectives, even those 
that would be important in a survival scenario, failed to activate the ancestral priorities 
proposed by this account. In contrast, the self-reference effect is more likely to occur with 
trait adjectives than with common nouns (e.g., Maki & McCaul, 1985). The current findings 
may, therefore, reflect the degree to which the stimuli were compatible with the survival and 
self-referential rating tasks.  
Experiment 4 attempted to address this issue by replacing trait adjectives with trait 
nouns. In contrast to the findings of Experiments 1 to 3, self-reference and survival 
processing produced equivalent levels of correct recognition. However, self-reference was 
associated with higher levels of recognition accuracy than the survival condition, due to 
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lower false alarm rates. This changed pattern provides some support for the role of stimulus 
type in the current findings. Nevertheless, the findings of Experiment 4 are still consistent 
with our argument that the advantage of survival processing over self-reference observed in 
previous studies is due to the use of an autobiographical self-reference task rather than a 
descriptive self-reference task. As an aside, to the best of our knowledge there have been no 
previous investigations of the self-reference effect (i.e., comparison between self-reference 
and other-reference conditions) using trait nouns. Such an investigation may help resolve the 
debate about whether the self-reference effect extends to nouns (see Keenan et al., 1992, and 
Maki & McCaul, 1985, for further discussion).  
A self-reference advantage for trait nouns was again observed in Experiment 5, in 
which memory was tested by recall rather than recognition. Experiment 5 also showed that 
the effects observed in Experiments 1 and 3 were not simply due to the use of stimuli low in 
imageability. Recent studies by Bell et al. (2013) and Kroneisen and Makerud (2016) found 
that the survival processing advantage was eliminated when the stimuli were of low 
imageability. In Experiment 5, however, the advantage following self-referential encoding 
was still observed when study lists consisted of both high- and low-imageability trait nouns. 
The nonsignificant interaction between rating task and imageability suggests the effect was 
not confined to the low-imageability items. Table 5 shows that self-reference led to higher 
recall levels than survival processing for both high- and low-imageability traits. It is also 
apparent, however, that the advantage for self-referential encoding was numerically higher 
for the low-imageability items than for the high-imageability items, suggesting that a role for 
imageability in mediating the survival and self-reference effects cannot be entirely ruled out. 
Further research into the effects of imageability and type of stimuli (traits versus object 
nouns) is needed to clarify this issue.  
©2018, Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Survival versus self-reference 
  30
As discussed in the Introduction, Burns et al. (2011) attributed the survival processing 
effect to the combined activation of item-specific and relational processing (Einstein & Hunt, 
1980; Hunt & Einstein, 1981). Burns et al. noted that the only other orienting task that 
activates both relational and item-specific processing, rather than a trade-off between the two, 
is self-reference. While this view is consistent with the findings of Klein et al. (2012) that 
survival processing and self-reference promote equivalent levels of recall when the self-
reference instructions require the retrieval of personal experiences, it cannot explain the 
findings from Experiments 1 to 3 that self-reference led to higher retention levels than 
survival processing. This explanation is also at odds with the finding from Experiment 4 that 
survival processing led to higher levels of false recognition than self-reference. Previous 
research has shown that false recognition is enhanced by relational encoding (e.g., McCabe, 
Presmanes, Robertson, & Smith, 2004). The pattern observed in Experiment 4 suggests that 
relational processing plays a more prominent role in survival processing than in self-
reference, though the low false alarm rate means this suggestion should be made with 
caution.  
A number of explanations of the self-reference effect have previously been proposed 
(see Symons & Johnson, 1997, for review). Although these pre-date the development of the 
survival processing paradigm, it is useful to consider the current findings in relation to them. 
One view is that self-reference boosts memory by enhancing the organization of to-be-
remembered stimuli (e.g., Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986). Descriptive self-reference judgements 
can result in the organization of the stimuli into two categories: those that are self-descriptive 
and those that are not. The tasks against which self-reference is typically compared (e.g., 
semantic judgements) do not typically give rise to the same level of organization. There are 
two reasons, however, why the current findings are unlikely to reflect differences in the 
organization of the stimuli. First, participants in the survival and moving rating conditions 
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had the same opportunity to organize the traits into two categories: those that would be useful 
in the scenario and those that would not. This is particularly true of the survival scenario used 
in Experiment 3, in which the stimuli were pre-rated as being either high or low in survival 
value. Despite the enhanced opportunity for organization into two categories in this 
condition, retention levels were still lower than in the self-reference condition. Second, the 
claim that self-reference leads to the creation of two categories is based on studies in which 
participants made yes/no decision about whether trait adjectives described them (e.g., Bower 
& Gilligan, 1979; Rogers et al, 1977). The organization of the traits into two categories is less 
likely to occur when ratings are collected on a likert scale, as in the current study. 
According to some researchers (e.g., Ferguson et al., 1983), self-reference enhances 
memory because it involves an evaluative component that is typically absent from other 
encoding tasks. In the current study, both the self-reference and the survival processing tasks 
required participants to evaluate the trait adjectives, therefore the involvement of evaluation 
per se cannot account for the current findings. It is likely, however, that the different ratings 
instructions led to differences in how the traits were evaluated (as they were designed to do). 
For example, rating traits for self-reference typically involves a social desirability judgement 
that is unlikely to have been activated in the survival condition, and it is this that may have 
led to the superior retention levels in the self-reference condition (see Ferguson et al.). The 
mnemonic advantage of social desirability is also suggested by the finding of Experiment 1 
that valence judgements, which are likely to reflect judgements of social desirability, led to 
numerically higher levels of recall than survival rating.  
One of the most influential accounts of the self-reference effect attributes the superior 
retention to enhanced elaboration of encoding (e.g., Keenan & Baillet, 1980; Markus, 1977; 
Rogers et al., 1977). As noted by Maki and McCaul (1985), the self-reference effect depends 
on the degree to which to-be-remembered stimuli can be encoded in relation to well-
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organized schema. One’s knowledge of oneself is typically rich and frequently used, 
therefore processing information in relation to oneself leads to higher levels of elaboration 
and greater ease of encoding relative to other encoding tasks (see Symons & Johnson, 1997). 
Trait dimensions are also the most common criteria on which individuals judge themselves 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991), therefore rating trait adjectives for self-reference is likely to 
lead to greater elaboration than rating them for their survival value.  
Interestingly, the survival processing effect has itself been attributed to enhanced 
elaboration. For example, Kroneisen et al. (2014) found that the survival processing 
advantage, relative to a moving home scenario, was eliminated when participants performed a 
concurrent task that engaged working memory processes (monitoring auditory tones). 
Kroneisen et al. concluded that the survival processing effect relies on effortful, elaborative 
processes rather than the automatic processes implied by the “selective tuning” hypothesis, as 
proposed by Nairne et al. (2007; see also Nairne, Vasconcelos, & Pandeirada, 2011). Of 
particular relevance to the current study is the finding by Nouchi (2013) that the mnemonic 
advantage of survival processing relative to self-reference was also eliminated by concurrent 
working memory load. Nouchi used the autobiographical self-reference task rather than the 
descriptive self-reference task employed in the current study, therefore the results cannot be 
directly compared. However, the role of elaboration indicated by these findings raises the 
possibility that rating trait adjectives for self-reference leads to greater elaboration than rating 
them for survival value. One way to test this account would be to adopt the procedure used by 
Nouchi and by Kroneisen et al. (2014) and instruct participants to rate the trait adjectives 
under conditions of concurrent load. We are currently investigating this possibility.  
It is also possible that the current findings reflect differences in the degree to which 
the survival processing and self-reference tasks cue episodic memories at study. Support for 
the importance of this factor comes from the findings of Klein (2012) that recall scores 
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produced by the autobiographical self-reference task, relative to survival processing, depend 
on whether or not the self-reference task requires the retrieval of episodic memories. Klein 
found that survival processing led to higher recall scores when the self-reference task 
required participants to rate how easily the words would cue a personal experience, but not 
when participants were instructed to retrieve a personal experience prior to rating how easily 
it came to mind. In other words, the retrieval of personal experiences at encoding led to recall 
levels equivalent to those produced by survival processing. It is possible, therefore, that the 
effects of survival processing and self-reference on memory reflect the degree to which the 
orienting tasks cue the activation of episodic memories. In order to account for the higher 
levels of recall and recognition following self-reference, one would have to assume that 
rating trait adjectives for self-reference is more likely to activate personal experiences than 
rating them for survival value. This is entirely plausible given the frequency with which 
individuals judge themselves in terms of personality traits and the relative unfamiliarity of the 
survival scenario. This possibility is also supported by the findings from Experiment 2 that 
rating trait adjectives for self-reference led to a selective increase in remember responses, 
which has been attributed to facilitation of the integration of new experiences into 
autobiographical memory (Conway et al., 2000).  
To summarise, the current findings show that rating personality traits for self-
reference leads to greater retention of the traits than rating them for their importance in a 
survival scenario. Whereas previous studies have shown that survival processing leads to 
higher retention levels than an autobiographical self-reference task (Kostic et al., 2012; 
Nairne et al., 2007, 2008; Nouchi & Kawashima, 2012), the current studies show that self-
reference leads to higher retention levels than survival processing when the descriptive self-
reference task is used. These findings indicate important boundary conditions of the survival 
processing effect and underline the mnemonic value of self-referential encoding. The 
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question of whether this effect is confined to personality traits, and the respective roles of 
factors such as imageability, elaboration, and the activation of personal memories, are issues 
that future research might profitably investigate.   
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Table 1 
Mean numbers (with standard deviations) of trait adjectives correctly recalled as a function 
of rating task and trait likeableness.  
 
Likeableness   Survival   Self-reference  Valence 
High (max=15)  6.03 (0.37)  7.33 (0.37)  6.00 (0.27) 
Low (max=15)  4.63 (0.31)  5.57 (0.37)  4.90 (0.28) 
Total (max=30)  10.67 (0.54)  12.90 (0.62)  10.90 (0.38) 
Intrusions   1.93 (1.99)  1.80 (1.97)  1.53 (1.87) 
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Table 2 
Mean proportions (with standard deviations) of trait adjectives correctly and falsely 
recognized as a function of rating task and response type.  
 
Response type   Survival   Self-reference  Moving home 
Total hits   .84 (.12)  .86 (.09)  .75 (.14) 
Correct remember  .63 (.18)  .75 (.12)  .50 (.19) 
Correct know    .21 (.18)  .10 (.09)  .26 (.20) 
Total false alarms  .07 (.06)  .05 (.04)  .10 (.08) 
False remember  .03 (.03)  .02 (.03)  .04 (.05) 
False know   .05 (.04)  .03 (.03)  .06 (.05) 
Total d'   2.59 (.72)  2.69 (.50)  2.04 (.64) 
Remember d'   2.25 (.59)  2.61 (.38)  1.75 (.65) 
Know d'   .78 (.56)  .49 (.43)  .83 (.76) 
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Table 3 
Mean numbers (with standard deviations) of trait adjectives correctly recalled as a function 
of rating task and survival value.  
 
Survival value   Survival planning Self-reference  Moving home 
High (max=12)  5.27 (1.72)  5.73 (1.51)  3.60 (1.63) 
Low (max=12)  5.40 (1.28)  6.50 (1.94)  3.67 (1.49) 
Total (max=24)  10.66 (1.50)  12.33 (1.73)  7.27 (1.56) 
Intrusions   0.83 (0.87)  0.47 (0.73)  2.03 (1.75) 
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Table 4 
Mean proportions (with standard deviations) of trait nouns correctly and falsely recognized 
as a function of rating task and response type.  
 
Response type   Survival   Self-reference  Moving home 
Total hits   .89 (.10)  .91 (.06)  .81 (.12) 
Correct remember  .74 (.21)  .79 (.20)  .55 (.21) 
Correct know    .15 (.17)  .12 (.21)  .26 (.17) 
Total false alarms  .06 (.06)  .02 (.03)  .04 (.04) 
False remember  .03 (.04)  .02 (.03)  .03 (.03) 
False know   .03 (.05)  .01 (.01)  .01 (.02) 
Total d'   2.93 (.68)  3.33 (.59)  2.71 (.61) 
Remember d'   2.68 (.73)  2.94 (.75)  2.10 (.64) 
Know d'   .78 (.56)  .49 (.43)  .83 (.76) 
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Table 5 
Mean numbers (with standard deviations) of trait nouns correctly recalled as a function of 
rating task and imageability.  
 
Imageability   Survival  Self-reference  Moving home 
High (max=12)  5.57 (1.77)  6.00 (1.55)  5.00 (1.82) 
Low (max=12)  4.57 (1.41)  5.70 (1.97)  3.40 (1.75) 
Total (max=24)  10.13 (2.29)  11.70 (2.15)  8.40 (2.81) 
Intrusions   0.83 (1.49)  0.37 (0.72)  1.17 (1.29) 
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